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Voiding Foreclosure Sale
(continued from page 131)
foreclosure sale.
Also, the court noted that Con-
gress did not intend to make a
fixed percentage the sole determin-
ing factor of reasonable equiva-
lence. Instead, the decision maker
should consider other relevant fac-
tors, such as the bargaining posi-
tion of the parties, the marketabili-
ty of the property, and the context
of a lawful foreclosure.
The court of appeals found that
the lower court incorrectly pre-
sumed a foreclosure sale brought
unreasonable prices if a foreclosing
party fails to prove otherwise. In-
stead, the court noted, a lawfully
conducted foreclosure sale is pre-
sumed to bring reasonably equiva-
lent value. Furthermore, the fore-
closure price-to-market value
percentage is only one factor rebut-
ting this presumption of reason-
ableness. Courts must also consid-
er other factors, such as fair
appraisal of the property, adver-
tisement of the foreclosure sale,
and competitive conditions sur-
rounding the sale.
Accordingly, the court of ap-
peals concluded that the Durrett
70 percent test should no longer be
mistaken as the law of the Eleventh
Circuit. Instead, the proper way to
determine a property's reasonable
equivalent value is to conduct a
thorough investigation into all the
relevant facts and circumstances.
Competing Policy Concerns
Now Met
The Eleventh Circuit concluded
that the totality of the circumstanc-
es test properly balanced the com-
peting interests of the borrower's
equity rights and the secured credi-
tor's concerns. While depending
solely on the Durrett Rule to void a
foreclosure sale might advance
bankruptcy policy, it violates the
policy of protecting a secured cred-
itor's rights. Courts, therefore,
must conduct a thorough analysis
of the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the foreclosure sale to
ensure that a foreclosing party
takes all commercially reasonable
steps to protect the competing in-
terests of both parties.
Case Remanded Back
To District Court
Because the record contained no
facts about the circumstances sur-
rounding the foreclosure sale, the
appellate court was unable to de-
termine whether the foreclosure
sale price was the reasonable
equivalent of the property's value.
For example, the court could not
decide if the bank took the reason-
able commercial steps necessary to
protect the debtor's equity in the
property. The record also con-
tained no facts regarding the com-
petitive conditions surrounding
the sale or the bank's efforts to
appraise the value of the property.
Thus, the appellate court vacated
both lower court orders and re-
manded the case to district court
for further proceedings.
Sharon Hannaford
California Supreme Court
Finds School Transportation
Fees Do Not Violate The
State's Constitution
In Arcadia Unified School Dis-
trict v. State Department of Educa-
tion, 825 P.2d 438 (Cal. 1992), the
Supreme Court of California con-
cluded that charging fees for school
transportation did not conflict
with either the free school guaran-
tee or the equal protection clause
of the California Constitution.
Taxpayer Wins Initial Suit
In 1985, Francisco Salazar ("Sa-
lazar") filed a taxpayers' suit in
Ventura County, California
against the State Department of
Education, the State Board of Edu-
cation, the Superintendent of Pub-
lic Instruction, and the Fillmore
Unified School District ("Educa-
tors"). Salazar claimed that the
Educators' implementation of
§39807.5 of the California Educa-
tion Code (Deering 1992), which
authorized school districts to
charge fees for student transporta-
tion, violated the free school guar-
antee and the equal protection
clause of the California Constitu-
tion.
The Court of Appeals, Second
District, Division Six, found it
unnecessary to join the school dis-
tricts as parties to the litigation and
concluded that §39807.5 violated
both the free school guarantee and
the equal protection clause of the
California Constitution. The Su-
preme Court of California denied
review of the appellate court deci-
sion and ordered that it not be
officially published. On remand,
the Ventura County Superior
Court entered a judgment against
the Educators.
School Districts' Suit Involved
Same Issue
Following the superior court's
order, the State Department of
Education ("Department") noti-
fied all school districts that
§39087.5 was unconstitutional and
instructed them to discontinue
charging for transportation. How-
ever, many school districts that
were not parties to the original
action did not follow the Depart-
ment's directive because of their
belief that §39807.5 was constitu-
tional. Twenty-five school districts
implemented an action in the Sac-
ramento Superior Court against
the Department to determine
whether §39807.5 was constitu-
tional on its face.
Salazar was permitted to be in-
cluded as a party and moved to
dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that
the Department and the school
districts, as agents of the Depart-
ment, were bound by the prior
decision in his taxpayer suit. The
superior court denied the motion
to dismiss and held that §39807.5,
on its face, violated the free school
guarantee of the California Consti-
tution.
The Court of Appeals, Third
District, unanimously reversed,
holding that the school districts
were not bound by the judgment in
the earlier action. The appellate
court found that the public interest
mandated such a conclusion and
therefore, did not reach the issue of
whether the school districts were
agents of the Department. The
appellate court also ruled that
§39807.5, on its face, did not vio-
late either the free school guaran-
tee or the equal protection clause
of the California Constitution.
This decision was appealed to the
California Supreme Court.
Volume 4 Number 4/Fall, 1992
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
School Districts Not Bound By
Prior Decision
The California Supreme Court
upheld the appellate court's con-
clusion that the school district suit
was not barred by the judgment in
Salazar's previous case. The court
determined that when the issue
involves only a question of law, not
a question of fact, a prior judgment
is not determinative if the result is
unjust or if the public interest
dictates relitigation of the issue.
Because the prior decision was
not officially published, no source
of legal authority existed. The re-
sult was uncertainty among the
school districts concerning the con-
stitutionality of §39807.5. The
court found that the public interest
of the students, taxpayers, and
school districts mandated that the
issue be resolved to provide unifor-
mity in the school districts. As
support for this conclusion, the
court reasoned that an erroneous
decision in Salazar's case could
deny the school districts revenue
they were statutorily entitled to
raise. Consequently, school dis-
tricts could be forced to eliminate
transportation if they were unable
to afford it without the revenue
authorized by the statute.
Moreover, in the original action,
evidence of the unconstitutionality
of the statute was presented. How-
ever, the school districts, which
were not parties to the action, did
not have an opportunity to defend
the constitutionality of the section.
No Violation of Free School
Guarantee
The California Supreme Court
determined that §39807.5 did not
violate the free school guarantee of
the California Constitution, which
provides for a free school in each
district for at least six months
every year after the first year in
which a school has been estab-
lished.
The court began its analysis by
attempting to examine the intent
of the framers of the California
Constitution but found little guid-
ance as to whether it was permissi-
ble for school districts to charge a
fee for transportation. The court
noted that the framers did not
consider transportation to be a
part of the school system, support-
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ing the view that transportation
was not part of the free school
guarantee.
Next, the court examined its
own decisions and those of other
states interpreting similar provi-
sions. In doing so, the court adopt-
ed the standard from a previous
California case that the free school
guarantee only extends to "neces-
sary elements of any school's activ-
ity."
In applying this standard, the
court refused to adopt Salazar's
argument that bus transportation
is a necessary element of any
school's activity. The court's anal-
ysis focused on the fact that, with-
out bus transportation, students
were not denied an opportunity to
receive an education. Bus trans-
portation was not an integral part
of the education system; while
transportation may provide conve-
nience for students, the court not-
ed that all students were not re-
quired to use the same mode of
transportation.
The court also reasoned that
transportation was not an expense
unique to education, such as text-
books and teachers' salaries. Fur-
ther, school districts are not re-
quired by law to provide bus
transportation for students. There-
fore, the court declined to find that
bus transportation was within the
scope of the free school guarantee
of the California Constitution.
Section 39807.5 Survives Equal
Protection Analysis
The supreme court further held
that §39807.5 did not facially vio-
late the equal protection clause of
the California Constitution. The
court rejected the argument that
the section discriminated against
poor students by creating a classifi-
cation based on wealth that affect-
ed the fundamental right to educa-
tion. The court pointed out that
students who are unable to pay the
transportation fees are exempt
from payment under the section.
The supreme court also rejected
the argument that the section pro-
moted inequality in the treatment
of students in different school dis-
tricts, depending on whether the
district charged for transportation
and how the district determined
the level of indigency that exempt-
ed a child from paying the trans-
portation fee. The court found that
these differences did not necessari-
ly result in a violation of the equal
protection clause.
When a school district provided
transportation without charge, it
was available to all students. In
districts that charged for the trans-
portation, those students who
could not afford it would still have
access to transportation. There-
fore, in either case, poor students
would have access to transporta-
tion if their school district chose to
provide it.
The Dissenting Opinion
As the lone dissenter, Justice
Mosk concluded that §39807.5 vio-
lated the free school guarantee of
the California Constitution. The
reasoning behind his conclusion
was that such fees would threaten
the opportunity for children who
could not afford transportation to
receive an education. He also be-
lieved that those who did not meet
the definition of indigent imposed
by the school district still might not
be able to afford transportation,
which could effectively deny stu-
dents access to an education. In
finding §39807.5 violative of the
free school guarantee clause, he did
not reach the issue of whether it
conflicted with the equal protec-
tion clause of the California Con-
stitution.
Barbara L. Gallagher
Baltimore City Kosher
Laws Require Intent To
Defraud Consumers
And Do Not Violate
Maryland's Constitution
In Barghout v. Mayor, 600 A.2d
841 (Md. 1992), the Maryland
Court of Appeals held that Balti-
more City kosher laws, which pro-
hibit fraud in the sale of kosher
products, do not violate the Mary-
land Constitution. Furthermore,
no individual who sincerely be-
lieves his conduct conforms to
kosher requirements can be con-
victed of violating kosher laws,
(continued on page 134)
